Nov 25, The problem of self-knowledge is one of the most fascinating in all of In this outstanding introduction Brie Gertler assesses the leading. Self-Knowledge has 14 ratings and 3 reviews. Sara said: A good intro to a still very new subject but the author was really very biased in her analysis of. Feb 7, In philosophy, “self-knowledge” standardly refers to knowledge of one’s . in direct introspective apprehension of a sensation (Gertler ;.

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Liuzm marked it as to-read May 02, Including helpful chapter summaries, annotated further reading and a glossary, Self Knowledge is essential reading for those interested in philosophy of mind, epistemology, and personal identity.

He tentatively proposes a functionalist analysis of these constitution relations ibid.: To see what your friends thought of this book, gertlrr sign up. Strikingly, their disagreement about the reliability of introspection remains even after their lengthy discussion of the results.

The problem of self-knowledge is one of the most fascinating in all of philosophy and has crucial significance for the philosophy of mind and epistemology. Paulo marked it as to-read Aug 16, RoutledgeNov 25, – Philosophy – pages. For even a slight difference between feeling cold and feeling not-cold will make a difference in the corresponding self-attributions. Within the class of transparency accounts, there are profoundly differing views about how self-knowledge is achieved and its epistemic status.

Some deny the assumption that recognizing a relationally defined state requires identifying vrie relational properties that make it the state that it is Burge ; Heil Philosophical Accounts of Self-KnowledgeAldershot: Peacocke argues that, in a broadly similar way, a conscious judgment that p can serve as a direct reason for my self-attributing the belief that pwithout my gettler any distinct awareness of that judgment.


What is crucial is that we are capable of the kind of self-knowledge that is needed for critical reasoning. By assimilating introspection to perception, inner sense accounts construe mentality as epistemically continuous with the nonmental, and thus allow a single overarching epistemology to apply to both self-knowledge and knowledge of external things.


She is not committed to a particular account of how avowals constitute knowledge, but she presents a number of approaches compatible with her neo-expressivism. Self-knowledge is thought to differ from other sorts of knowledge in one or more of the following ways.

A complete account must also explain how the introspective process correctly classifies the type of mental state at issue: Contemporary philosophers generally deny that we are infallible or omniscient about our mental states. James Ziegler is currently reading it Nov 30, Boghossian concludes that we face a trilemma mnowledge self-knowledge. Ricardo Di Napoli marked it as to-read Aug 22, Mandy rated it liked it Oct 12, It applies only to attitudes that express knowledg rational agency, and hence only to attitudes that are sensitive to reasons.

First-person authority stems from the fact that it is only the subject herself who can directly express her states through an avowal. Paperbackpages. Self-Knowledge New Problems of Philosophy.

Brie Gertler, Self‐Knowledge and Rational Agency: A Defense of Empiricism – PhilArchive

But Schwitzgebel has also suggested that our attitudes about introspection may kowledge particularly obstinate.

What is special about self-knowledge, compared to knowledge in other domains?

In any case, the omniscience thesis may also be qualified. Doubts about self-knowledge are also fueled by more general epistemological concerns, such as the familiar worry that the observational process unavoidably alters the target of observation Hill[ 1 ] and doubts about the possibility of theory-free observations Dennett Acquaintance accounts hold gerhler appeal for epistemic foundationalists, who claim that all of our knowledge rests on a foundation of beliefs that are justified, but not justified by other beliefs.


Williamson has argued against a particular, seemingly plausible thesis regarding self-knowledge: Some theorists who take knowledhe line maintain that there is a causal gap between a perceptual state and its object, and this gap introduces sources of error that are absent in direct introspective apprehension of a sensation Gertler ; Horgan ; Siewert Among Gertler’s other fields of study are epistemology and the philosophy of language.

The claim that introspective access is both epistemically and metaphysically direct is most plausible for phenomenal states like pain. The problem of self-knowledge is one of the most fascinating in all of knowledte and has crucial significance for the philosophy of mind and epistemology. It is metaphysically direct in that no event or process mediates between my awareness and the mental state itself. Neo-expressivists allow that these practices, while standard, admit of exceptions.

There remains sensations, emotions and appetites. She has written a book, Privileged Access Brie Gertler is a philosopher who works primarily on problems in the philosophy of the mind.

We might speak here of a distinctive logical space in which we locate mental items and their expressions along with the circumstances against whose background they have the significances that they do. In effect, he is proposing that what it is for a rational creature to have a belief is, in part, for that creature to be aware of that belief; what it is for a rational creature to be in pain is, in part, for it to be aware of that pain; etc. For more on that egrtler, see Bayne and Montague Inferential Justification and the Transparency of Belief.